This article examines the Asian cocaine trade of the early twentieth century. It argues that the distribution of cocaine into Asian colonial ports was controlled by people from southeastern China who took advantage of a convergence of factors: consumer markets in India and Southeast Asia, shifting political winds surrounding drug use, the rise of Japan, and the translocal nature of southern Fujianese society. Xiamen was not only a port but also the hub of a society that was omnipresent in the maritime world of early twentieth-century Asia: natives of southern Fujian resided in Calcutta, Singapore, Rangoon, Manila, and Kobe, constituting a huge percentage of the crew and passengers of the steamships that connected those places. The implications of this story are relevant to two important themes of this special issue: the history of control and evasion in maritime Asia, and, relatedly, the ways in which states sought to extend their jurisdiction over the seas. Fujianese cocaine smugglers saw an opportunity when colonial governments banned cocaine imports, and took advantage of their place within the Japanese imperial sphere to acquire drugs and penetrate colonial markets. The evidence presented here thus highlights the place of opportunism and entrepreneurialism within the wider history of state efforts to control trade.
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Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 25 (December 2017) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue- 25) issue-"extend jurisdiction over the seas for taxation, security, and sovereignty." The successful evasion tactics of the Fujitsuru network are also instructive, as they offer a unique perspective on the limits of surveillance and control. Despite the clout of the British Empire and the League of Nations, Slattery and his allies were unable to stop the flow of cocaine or adequately identify who was ultimately responsible for the illegal trade. The evidence presented here indicates that the southern Fujianese port of Xiamen was the central processing and packaging depot for the Fujitsuru brand, and that the monopoly of Fujianese maritime entrepreneurs on this trade was achieved through their ability to take advantage of consumer markets and imperial networks. As illustrated in figure 1, Xiamen served to connect Asian cocaine producers in Japan and Taiwan to consumers in ports across South and Southeast Asia. In the beginning, the Asian cocaine trade was forged by Chinese pharmacists who took advantage of certain contingencies-namely, new restrictions in India and Europe that made the drug increasingly profitable and a preexisting network of Fujianese on steamships and abroad who made importing and exporting cocaine a logistical possibility. As the tectonic plates of global imperialism shifted in the years following World War I, the cocaine smugglers of Xiamen maintained their position without disruption. The rise of Japanese power in South China altered the patterns of drug dealing in Fujian by creating incentives for people to swap their Chinese citizenship for Japanese protection. Meanwhile, the investment of Japanese drug companies in cocaine production created an alternative source of product at precisely the moment at which the League of Nations was cutting off traditional European sources. From beginning to end, there was no Asian cocaine trade without the special ability of Fujianese natives to adapt to these changes while continuing to import the drug into China, repackage and label it, and then export and distribute the drug throughout maritime Asia. The Fujianese monopoly over the Asian cocaine trade was thus the result of the historical convergence of a translocal society with the rise of the Japanese Empire in South China.
The translocal nature of southern Fujianese society was the engine of the Asian cocaine trade. Following the conceptualization of "Translocal China" developed by cultural geographer Tim Oakes and anthropologist Louisa Schein, which emphasizes "the relationship between mobility and place " (2006, xii) , the argument being made here is premised on the idea that the port of Xiamen was not just a city, but a network of people, goods, and institutions that was based in this particular place yet had nodes across China and maritime Asia. The people of southern Fujian, like the natives of neighboring Chaozhou studied by historian Melissa Macauley, "tended to travel to the same places, live in close proximity to one another, and establish institutions that reinforced the cultural bond within expatriate communities and with their home villages" (2016, 757) . The translocal dynamic of Fujianese society has persisted into the twentyfirst century, as recent scholarship demonstrates (see, for example, Pieke et al. 2004) . Further, as historian Madeline Hsu's work makes evident, transnational approaches to the history of South China are indispensable, since migration has long been an integral part of southern Chinese society and migrants from this part of China have tended to maintain strong connections with their native place (2000) . As such, this article views twentieth-century Xiamen as the swirling hub of a mobile society that extended across maritime Asia, thriving on the transgression, evasion, and manipulation of borders, taxes, and jurisdictions. The creation and maintenance of Xiamen as a cocaine distribution center was possible because translocal Xiamen had long since extended itself into Kobe, Taipei, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Rangoon, and Calcutta; the city existed, too, among the crews, compradors, and passengers aboard the shipping lines that connected maritime Asia.
This article therefore illustrates the perspective on control and evasion in maritime Asia that can be gained by focusing on the people who purchased, repackaged, and carried cocaine from manufacturer to end user. In Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China, historians Frank Dikötter, Lars Laamann, and Zhou Xun (2004) argue that the drug trade in China is best explained as a product of consumer demand, downplaying the relationship between opium, imperialism, and warlord politics. Similarly, James Mills argues that the story of the Indian cocaine trade is one of a consumer-driven market: it was a trade operated by "a motley gaggle of small-time and uncoordinated entrepreneurs" rather than driven forward by a powerful, wellorganized body such as the British East India Company (Mills 2007, 359) . The research presented here makes clear that the people bringing cocaine to South and Southeast Asia may have been a "motley gaggle," but they were hardly small-time or uncoordinated. As Slattery noted about the ports in India and Southeast Asia, "the import traffic in cocaine is almost entirely center of the Japanese sphere of influence in South China, where the Japanese government never had to worry about drug use because it was not their jurisdiction.
From the Japanese perspective, Xiamen was attractive as the gateway from China to Southeast Asia, and the most important port of call for ships from Japan's new colony in Taiwan.
By the second decade of the twentieth century, Xiamen was flooded with Taiwanese citizens (who were Japanese imperial citizens), and even more so with local people claiming JapaneseTaiwanese citizenship. These were people who were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically Chinese, but registered as Japanese: the so-called "registered people" (Ch. jimin 籍民; J. One of the stated goals of this practice was for the Japanese foreign ministry to extend jurisdiction over the business networks connecting China and Southeast Asia (Inoue 1993, 12-13) . The Japanese consuls in Fujian clearly understood the potential of harnessing the entrepreneurial genius of translocal Xiamen.
A principal consequence of Japan's policy of granting passports to Fujianese was the rapid domination of the drug trade by people with Taiwanese citizenship. The extraterritorial protection granted to jimin by Japanese consuls and their independent police forces provided almost perfect insulation from local Chinese municipal and warlord governments (Esselstrom 2009, 43-44; Thai 2016, 91 ; see also Tseng 2014 on jimin-owned businesses in the port of Shantou). Thus, an expanding drug trade seems foreseeable in hindsight; but, beyond the reluctance of Japanese consuls to reign in drug dealers, there is little evidence that a robust drug trade was the deliberate aim of Japan's southern strategy. There is, however, ample evidence that people in Fujian flocked in large numbers to take up Japanese citizenship in order to better profit from the drug trade (Thilly 2015; Wang 2007) .
In this sense, Japanese consuls and pharmaceutical companies worked together with Chinese drug traders to form an alternative model of Sino-Japanese cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s. In some cases, the relationships created through the drug trade furthered the cause of Japanese expansion into the Chinese mainland-in particular, the history of Taiwanese-owned opium dens and the rise of the Xiamen Japanese police force to protect them from Chinese interference (Thilly 2015; Wang 2007) . But in other cases-like the cocaine trade examined in this article-the end result was unpredictable, and less obviously advantageous to Japan. As historian Steven Karch writes, cocaine was never a "vital product line" for the Japanese drug companies involved in production, and "the cocaine trade was just not that important " (1999, 158) . The cocaine trade is thus an example of an unforeseen consequence of Japanese policy in South China and maritime Asia, as the only clear beneficiaries were Chinese smugglers and, to a lesser degree, the Japanese pharmaceutical companies who supplied them.
Pharmacists, Steamships, and the European Origins of the Fujianese Cocaine Trade
Cocaine first became an important commodity in the Xiamen drug market during the height of the late Qing opium prohibition movement (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) . During these early years, Xiamen was responsible for nearly all of the cocaine imported into China from Europe, and local The elevated stature of Xiamen within the Chinese cocaine trade was due not to local consumption, but to the ability of locals to effectively and clandestinely serve consumers across maritime Asia. As it turns out, cocaine was not an especially popular drug among the Fujianese.
One British customs official interpreted the rise in cocaine imports in Xiamen as evidence that "subcutaneous injection is undoubtedly on the increase," and the American consul to Xiamen in 25) 1911 suggested that cocaine and morphine had been used in the past to help people quit the opium habit but that "the practice has long since been discontinued."
5 But beyond these two references there is scant evidence for cocaine use in Xiamen during these years, while opium and morphine use in the region is well documented. Meanwhile, there does exist significant evidence that the vast majority of cocaine imported into Xiamen was re-exported to the Straits Settlements and Burma, places with long histories of Fujianese migration. The smuggling was possible, argued one British investigator, because authorities in those places were only on the lookout for drugs coming directly from Europe, and "it is supposed that steamers from Amoy trading to those places will not be suspected of carrying such articles" (IOC 1909, 2:68-69 ).
There was an established market for cocaine in the South and Southeast Asian colonial and goes on to suggest that the drug was being imported from Germany through the post ("Illicit Sale" 1908) . As Mills (2007) has documented, the cocaine habit spread quickly in South Asia in the first two decades of the twentieth century, as the drug was used as an additive to betel nut paste and was consumed across class lines. By 1910, authorities in Burma and the Straits Settlements were sending the British consul in Xiamen "constant complaints" of cocaine smuggling "by the native crews of the steamers which carry on the coolie emigration trade between Amoy and the places named [i.e., the Straits Settlements and Burma]." 6 Exporting cocaine from China was made possible by passenger steamship lines that connected Xiamen directly to the high-consumption regions of the Straits Settlements, Burma, and India. These steamers not only brought waves of Fujianese migrants to and from China, but were also often crewed by natives of southern Fujian and eastern Guangdong.
Originally, European pharmaceutical companies and smuggling networks were the primary importers of cocaine into Asia. German scientists in the 1850s were the first to isolate the cocaine alkaloid from coca leaves grown in South America, and the drug was popularized in Europe during the 1880s by ophthalmologists and dentists who used it as a topical anesthetic.
Cocaine's use as an anesthetic spread widely; for example, a Singapore newspaper from 1901
reported that "injection of cocaine into the spine is taking the place of general anesthesia… it is considered safer" ("Untitled" 1901) . Then, during the first decade of the twentieth century, as people across the world began to use the drug in contexts other than general anesthesia, prohibitionists managed to include cocaine on the list of controlled substances in the International Opium Convention signed at the Hague in 1912. This step made it significantly more difficult for European pharmaceutical companies to sell to end users in European colonial territories.
China presented a solution. The Xinhai Revolution and devolution of central control in China after 1911 made local officials less capable than their European counterparts of monitoring how pharmacists who legally imported cocaine were distributing the drug. E. S.
Cheong was the best-known Xiamen pharmacist who dealt cocaine, but before he appeared on the scene, another alleged pharmacist-cum-cocaine peddler was the "loud-mouthed patriot" Huang Tingyuan (黃廷元), who earned his dental degree in Japanese-occupied Taiwan and took advantage of his medical degree and the weak local government to smuggle cocaine. 7 Once users in India and Burma could no longer rely on direct shipments from Europe, men like Huang and
Cheong were able to assume a critical role in connecting manufacturer to end user.
Outside of pharmacists who could import the drug under legal cover, cocaine smuggling 
The Fujitsuru Brand(s) and the Rise of Japanese-Made Drugs in Asia
The introduction to this article cited two seizures in Rangoon wherein the Fujitsuru brand and other drugs belonging to no registered company had been packaged together with a portion of genuine brand-name European drugs that had been legally imported into China. The pharmacist who imported those drugs into Xiamen under license from the Maritime Customs, Dr. E. S. Cheong, was a man with powerful connections. He was an intimate of the father-in-law of Garfield Huang (黃嘉慧), president and founder of the National Anti-Opium Association, and a close friend of Wu Liande (伍連德), director of the National Quarantine Service.
14 According to a British investigation, Cheong was also on friendly terms with the superintendent of trade in Xiamen, the officer in charge of issuing import licenses for controlled substances, including cocaine (Slattery 1932) . As one well-positioned informant put it, Cheong was at this point "the only trafficker" left in Xiamen who still procured any of his drugs from Europe (Slattery 1932) .
By the late 1920s, it was much cheaper and easier to import drugs from Japan, as even Cheong and his business partners were doing. Cheong's brand-name European drugs were packed In one such seizure, a northern Indian sailor named Nazir Ahmat (figure 2) was arrested in together with opium and morphine smuggled into the U.S. colony from Xiamen. 17 It was never found in North China, or on any Japanese-owned shipping line.
Slattery believed that the drug was Japanese in origin because of the heavy investment in cocaine production by Japanese pharmaceutical companies. "Japan is the only country in the East which manufactures the drug, and cocaine has been discovered in India bearing the labels of recognized Japanese factories," he wrote, "but Japan has always maintained that the Fujitsuru, Elephant and Buddha brands are not of Japanese origin" (Slattery 1932 ). This was suspicious to
Slattery not only because the name Fujitsuru sounds Japanese, but because Japan was home to several companies that produced cocaine: the Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company, as well as Koto Seiyaku and Sankyo. The Hoshi Company had originally purchased land for the cultivation of coca leaves in Peru in 1917, a year after the Ensuiko Sugar Company first initiated experimental coca production in Taiwan (Karch 1999, 151) . In the 1920s, in order to save money on importing coca leaf from South America, Japan's pharmaceutical companies determined to set up coca plantations in Taiwan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and also purchased from Dutch growers in Java, who had been cultivating coca there since the 1850s (Karch 1999, 147, 156) . The Hoshi Company and Taiwan Shoyaku companies, on a combined 694 acres of land in the Taiwanese interior, produced a total of 700,814 kilograms of coca leaf between 1927 and 1931, about onefifth of which was transferred to Japan for processing; the rest was processed into crude cocaine by those companies' factories in Taiwan. 18 Karch calculates the total production of coca leaf in Taiwan during these years at around 150,000 tons per year, which, once processed into cocaine, would have yielded around seven tons per year (1999, (155) (156) .
While Slattery and the League of Nations investigators never found conclusive evidence that Fujitsuru cocaine was produced with Japanese official knowledge, they had good reason to suspect that Japan's annual reports on cocaine production were a tissue of lies. Both Slattery and independent League of Nations investigators argued that the figures submitted by Japan to the League showed evidence that raw and partially processed cocaine was disappearing into the system. 19 In Taiwan, where the estimated legal medical consumption of cocaine was 38 kilograms per year, the amount of cocaine that Japanese companies produced jumped from 291 kilograms in 1927 to 819 kilograms in 1928, and hovered around 800 kilograms per year for several years thereafter. 20 Similarly, as one British Home Office official complained, there was also a great deal more cocaine being produced in Japan than seemed medically necessary: "The total quantity of cocaine admitted by the Japanese Government to have been manufactured appears to be greatly in excess of the medical requirements of the population of Japan." 21 Slattery himself asked the Japanese Home Department to account for the missing cocaine: "Why was there excess manufacture of 337 kilogrammes during [1929] , an excess of some 700 kilogrammes in 1928 and of some 850 kilogrammes in 1927; and what has happened to these enormous surplus stocks? Presumably this expensive drug is not manufactured irrespective of demand and allowed to decay on the factory shelves" (Slattery 1932) . No satisfactory answer was ever produced.
The most plausible explanation is that the missing Japanese cocaine was being clandestinely exported from Japan and Taiwan to Xiamen, where it was cut with novocaine and re-exported with various counterfeit labels to Singapore, Rangoon, and beyond. The Fujitsuru cocaine had to be coming from somewhere, yet-as Slattery noted-the Fujitsuru, Elephant, and Buddha brands of cocaine "have never been found on a Japanese ship, or in the possession of a Japanese" (Slattery 1932) . Moreover, the geographic range of Fujitsuru was confined to southern China and the ports of South and Southeast Asia. "It is a matter of common knowledge," wrote one officer investigating the traffic, "that there is extensive smuggling from Japan into North China, through Shanghai and Tientsin, yet these 'mystery' brands are entirely unknown there" (Slattery 1932 ). If Fujitsuru cocaine was being sold out of Japan, it almost certainly would have made its way to North China and Korea, where there was an established market for cocaine. The fact that Fujitsuru cocaine was a southern affair-surfacing in Xiamen, Hong Kong, Batavia, Singapore, Rangoon, Calcutta, Bombay, and occasionally in Manila, but never in Shanghai, Dalian, or Tianjin-gives credibility to the notion that it was a Taiwanese-Fujianese operation and not one based in Japan proper.
Evidence from the receiving end of the trade in India and Southeast Asia also showcases the dominance of Chinese traffickers over the Fujitsuru cocaine trade, even to the exclusion of would-be Japanese participants. A professional smuggler surnamed Gibson who attempted to lighten his sentence by divulging information about the trade told Slattery that, in Calcutta, the import of cocaine was controlled exclusively by a Chinese woman who had previously resided in Bombay, and who had monopolized access to the Peshawari wholesale distributers responsible for selling off the drug within Calcutta. 22 A similar system existed in Bombay, where Chinese middlemen controlled the receipt of cocaine from sailors on incoming steamers and then sold it off to the Rampuri distributers. As Slattery noted, when Japanese sailors attempted to smuggle known Japanese cocaine brands into Calcutta, they also had to sell their drug to the Chinese traffickers who controlled the import trade (1932).
Evidence from Xiamen also points to the numerous ways that cocaine products were brought into Fujian from Japan and Taiwan for re-export. In many cases, German and Japanese brand-name cocaine imported by people like E. S. Cheong was doctored locally with inferior
Taiwanese product (as well as novocaine, milk powder, and other powdery white substances) and repackaged for the Southeast Asian and South Asian markets. The American journalist Haldore Hanson reported in 1936 that around 300 tins of "genuine medicinal cocaine" and 1,000
tins of "cheap unrefined cocaine" were smuggled into Xiamen from Taiwan monthly, mostly for refining, packaging, branding, and then, finally, reshipping to the "South Seas and Malaysia" (Hanson 1936a) . A retired smuggler interviewed by Slattery in Japan stated that large quantities of cocaine were smuggled from Japan to Xiamen using two methods: in secret consignments on steamers from the coal ports of Japan, and by steamer or fishing boat down to Keelung in Taiwan and then on small fishing or motorboats across to Xiamen from the southern end of the island (Hanson 1936a) . Indeed, the 1920s and 1930s saw the rise of diesel-engine motorboats plying between Taiwan and the mainland in a matter of hours, making smuggling exponentially more difficult to police. Speaking from a personal history of smuggling cocaine into Xiamen, one professional smuggler stated that "the place is full of junks and sampans, and it is a matter of ease to evade the maritime customs people." The labels attached to Fujitsuru and other mystery cocaine brands (figure 3) also provide clues that point to Xiamen. As the Japanese government consistently told Slattery and League of Nations investigators, the Fujitsuru brand cocaine labels "could not be Japanese because the printing was inferior to that of modern Japanese work" (Slattery 1932 ). In the Wai Kee case, a Xiamen-area printer named Lee Lang Kun was engaged in printing false Koto Seiyaku, Boehringer, and Fujitsuru labels for seven dollars per sheet (Slattery 1932) . Fujian was a notorious and well-established center for the market in counterfeit labels. 25 In 1922, the British consul in Xiamen lodged complaints about counterfeit soap, water bottle, candle, and pharmaceutical labels. Several of the accused counterfeiters had Taiwanese citizenship; many were located in outlying districts beyond Xiamen. 26 Using his trusty Hanovia analysis lamp, Slattery was able to identify a multiplicity of "Fujitsuru" labels: some with more or less detail on the plumage of the storks, some with more or less clear outlines of the back of the bird, and each hosting an array of different stamped monograms (Slattery 1932) . In a place like Xiamen, the printing of false Fujitsuru, Boehringer, Elephant, and Buddha labels would have been easy to arrange, and such counterfeits inspired counterfeits of their own. There is a degree of cooperation between the Japanese and the Chinese in Fukien, which includes some concessions on both sides, though more by the Chinese, to be sure. It might almost be ventured that Fukien today, with the exception of its opium traffic, represents the type of Sino-Japanese co-operation for which Dr. Hu Shih and other Chinese were looking when they maintained their pacifism throughout the 1931-33 military penetration. It is a commercial penetration initiated by individual businessmen, moderated by the Japanese consul, and tolerated by the Fukien public. That is the extent of Japanese designs on Fukien to-day [sic] . (Hanson 1936b) Hanson was proven wrong on his last point after Japan's military invasion of Fujian two years later. But he was probably correct to identify a "degree of cooperation" in Fujian that was qualitatively different from the relationships between Japanese and Chinese people in other parts of the mainland. The notion might be discomfiting for those used to stark categories of resistance and collaboration, but Fujian has been the site of a complex relationship between profit-seeking and defiance of central authority going back at least as far as the sixteenth century.
As I argue elsewhere (Thilly 2015 (Thilly , 2017 , the terms yanhai jianmin (treacherous coastal people) and hanjian (traitorous Han) became affixed to coastal drug traders in Fujian during the late 1830s and early 1840s. This discourse grew out of a strained relationship between Fujian's maritime lineages and the Qing state that dated back to the conquest of Fujian in the seventeenth century, to the war between Zheng Chenggong's forces and the conquering Manchu state.
Resentments surrounding the coastal evacuation scorched earth policy lasted well into the Qing period, bubbling up between the people living on the Fujian coast and the central administrators dispatched to govern them. These tensions were further exacerbated by the war on drugs of the late 1830s (Thilly 2017) . The legacy of this strained relationship was still evident in Fujian during the early twentieth century, after the collapse of the Qing and the rise of Japanese power in Taiwan and across China. It was never a given that the loyalty of Fujian's maritime lineages would automatically gravitate to whichever power might claim the mantle of the Chinese state.
Where people from other parts of China saw the use of Japanese protection by Fujian's coastal population as treasonous, most Fujianese probably saw themselves as nothing but loyal. They were loyal to the most important power sources they had ever recognized: the lineage, the village, and profit. And, as ever, the Fujianese method of accumulating profit and strengthening the lineage was inherently translocal, with nephews, sons, and other relations dispatched from the locality to other parts of China, to maritime Asia and beyond, each constituent member submitting to or defying authorities as was expedient.
Within this context, Hanson was wrong to call the drug trade an "exception." The drug trade was the ultimate product of Sino-Japanese cooperation, though obviously a different sort of cooperation from that envisioned by Hu Shih. But drugs were the rule, rather than an exception; they were the precise reason why Japanese consuls were able to recruit so many Fujianese to take up Taiwanese citizenship. Drugs were the staple of the Japanese-protected economy in southern Fujian, and the drug trade in Fujian could not have thrived in the way it did without both Chinese and Japanese involvement. This holds true for the Japanese-registered opium dens owned by Taiwanese gangsters, for the morphine importation schemes operated by Chinese middlemen out of firms in Kobe and Osaka, and for the mysterious Fujitsuru cocaine operation that relied on Taiwanese coca and Fujianese shipping crews and counterfeit specialists.
In the spirit of this special issue, cocaine is useful for understanding how the Japanese and British Empires competed for dominance over the seas of maritime Asia, and the ways in which ordinary people responded to and shaped these efforts. As the British Empire grew increasingly concerned about cocaine use in its colonial possessions, the British government signed on to international conventions and spearheaded multinational efforts to suppress the drug.
Meanwhile, Japanese consuls in South China were busy granting colonial citizenship to tens of thousands of Fujianese in what seems to have been an effort to gain a firmer grasp over the maritime connections between China and Southeast Asia, a sort of territorialization through citizenship. Japan's imperial project may have benefitted from this-see historian Man-Houng Lin's (2001) work on the Taiwanese tea trade in Indonesia-but the principal effects were felt in Fujian, where the exploding number of jimin took over the drug trade and wreaked havoc on a local state that was powerless to arrest foreign citizens. Cocaine traders thrived in the chaotic atmosphere of Republican-era Fujian, and their chosen enterprise was one that extended a Japanese product (or at least one made with Japanese raw materials) into the South and Southeast Asian colonies of European powers. This branch of the cocaine trade was also one that the Japanese state had deemed illegal, and the Japanese government had explicitly disavowed association with the Fujitsuru brand. The Asian cocaine trade was thus built on the opportunities engendered by British prohibition efforts, but it fits uneasily into an analysis of Japanese empire building during this period. It was a trade that was impossible without the Japanese Empire, but the primary beneficiaries were Chinese.
The way in which the Fujianese operated the pan-Asian cocaine trade during the 1930s highlights the place of opportunism and entrepreneurialism within this special issue's larger discussion of control and evasion in maritime Asia. As conceptualized by the guest editors, "evasion" is about people who "organize against the boundary setting and rationalization projects of state-builders" (emphasis mine). I think it is possible to read this interpretation into the actions of Fujian's cocaine smugglers, but I think it is also important to recognize the ways in which they organized in response to, or indeed along the lines set by, state builders. Smuggling is not merely trade that the state has made illegal; it also comes into being as a type of trade that the state has made more lucrative by deeming it illegal. The Fujianese do not seem to have been terribly interested in consuming cocaine. Thus, the cocaine trade is not a story of a preexisting trade that the state made illegal. Rather, because of state initiatives to control the cocaine tradeinitiatives that originated in Europe and constrained European drug traders' abilities to supply recreational users in European colonies-cocaine smugglers found an opportunity to use or subvert those same state initiatives for great profit. 
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